











Distribution and consumption 
of counterfeit alcohol:  












Jon Spencer, Centre for Criminology and Criminal Justice, University of Manchester  
Nicholas Lord, Centre for Criminology and Criminal Justice, University of Manchester  
Cecilia Flores Elizondo, Centre for Criminology and Criminal Justice, University of 
Manchester  
 
Contact person details  
 
Jon Spencer, Centre for Criminology and Criminal Justice 
University of Manchester  







There are a number of people who have been important in this research. Kauko Aromaa 
(1944-2019) for his insights into counterfeiting and its organisation during informal 
discussion prior and during this research, we dedicate this report to his memory.  
Peter Whelan and John Coady at The Food Safety Authority Ireland for their support and 
discussions of the regulator’s role. To all the hard-pressed Trading Standards Officers 
and Environmental Health Officers who gave freely of their time to share their 
experiences of investigating counterfeit alcohol and the challenges they face. To Alcohol 
Change UK for their support and encouragement of this research. Finally, to the 
respondents who we interviewed and who gave us a glimpse of the world of counterfeit 












This report was funded by Alcohol Change UK. Alcohol Change UK works to 
significantly reduce serious alcohol harm in the UK. We create evidence-driven 
change by working towards five key changes: improved knowledge, better policies 
and regulation, shifted cultural norms, improved drinking behaviours, and more and 
better support and treatment. 
 
Find out more at alcoholchange.org.uk.  
 







Executive summary ........................................................................................................... 1 
Project aims, methods and design .................................................................................... 4 
The case study and getting to grips with production ....................................................... 12 
Findings .......................................................................................................................... 17 
Regulatory responses ..................................................................................................... 24 
Understanding counterfeit alcohol markets ..................................................................... 28 











Several reported incidents of counterfeit alcohol operations were followed by dire 
warnings in the press to potential consumers of blindness, and even death, should 
counterfeit alcohol be purchased and consumed. There were reports of illegal stills that 
had exploded and where there had been fatalities of those involved in illicit production. 
However, the reporting appeared to be episodic, reactive to events, and with little follow-
up on the outcome of investigations.  
 
Contact with a European regulator provided the impetus to investigate counterfeit alcohol 
and apply a criminological perspective. Case files were made available for analysis and 
with application of routine activity theory, script analysis and a social network analysis, it 
was possible to gain a greater understanding of the organisation and distribution of 
counterfeit alcohol.  
 
The lack of follow-up in relation to reported cases and a general lack of interest in the 
issue of counterfeit alcohol by regulators could be explained by counterfeit alcohol not 
being a significant problem in terms of potential damage to health or revenue lost. 
Another possible explanation was that counterfeit alcohol was a problem that presented 
several challenges that were time consuming, costly and with little benefit once 
prosecuted and so it was not prioritised or defined as a significant problem.  
 
There was a lack of criminological curiosity in the topic. Criminology has an interest in 
drug use and markets, counterfeiting of goods from aircraft parts to clothes and fashion 
accessories, but not alcohol. There is an increasing interest in food fraud. In utilising 
previous research strategies from food fraud, it was appropriate to consider the 




The aims of the project were: 
 
• Provide a greater understanding of the social factors that influence counterfeit alcohol 
distribution and consumption 
• Develop a detailed understanding of the distribution mechanisms of counterfeit alcohol 
 
To realise these aims a number of approaches were used to understand and analyse the 
data. Routine activity theory assumes a crime can be committed in a situation where 
there is a criminal opportunity, there is a motivated offender(s) and there is a lack of 
capable guardianship. Script analysis provides the opportunity to develop a framework 
that structures possible crime scenes, these are the things that need to happen for the 
crime to occur, the necessary actors involved, and the resources required for a 
successful execution of the crime. Social network analysis provides the opportunity to 
analyse the relationships and roles of actors in the crime scenes and their connections 
with each other and others in the prosecution of the crime. This can identify hidden 






1 Cheaper brands, and ‘own brand’ vodka appear to be the most vulnerable to 
counterfeiting. One Trading Standards officer expected luxury brands to be more 
vulnerable, however, there is no indication of this from the data.  
2 Trading Standards officers appear to rely on intelligence in cases of counterfeit 
alcohol or on a consumer complaint. There is no case we found where counterfeit 
alcohol was discovered through normal routine regulatory visits to retailers. 
3 The distribution of counterfeit alcohol has a very opaque supply chain and it is 
challenging for Trading Standards officers to trace back more than one step. This 
hinders prosecution and makes the understanding of distribution networks more 
challenging.  
4 The opaqueness of distribution networks makes investigating the production networks 
even more challenging owing to lack of the visibility of supply chain networks. 
5 The successful distribution of counterfeit alcohol relies, in part, on its integration into 
the market as ‘legitimate’ product. The ‘branding’ of the counterfeit product as a 
‘known’ brand appears to induce consumer confidence in the product. 
6 There are certain activities that provide a cover for illicit distribution. The use of 
legitimate delivery networks, for example, delivery vans and other legitimate traders, 
such as taxis, are an aid to concealing distribution. There are many other forms of 
legitimate delivery service that could be utilised for the distribution of counterfeit 
alcohol. These distribution methods make it complex to trace the supply chain back 
from the point of delivery. 
7 Recent cutbacks to Local Authority funding have impacted on the capacity of Trading 
Standards Offices to investigate activities other than those which receive a high 
priority. This can make the distribution of counterfeit alcohol less risky for those 




It is not possible to generalise from one detailed case study alone, but it has been 
possible to gain further insight into distribution strategies and to also frame questions to a 
variety of respondents involved in the regulatory process and those who are the potential 
buyers of counterfeit alcohol. This alongside an analysis of various reported cases and 
an examination of on-line opportunities for distributing and purchasing counterfeit alcohol 
provides a reliable foundation to begin to develop some conclusions in relation to the 
distribution of counterfeit alcohol.  
 
There are a number of implications: 
 
1 It is necessary to gain a more detailed analysis of the locations of sale of counterfeit 
alcohol. There are number of ways that this could be achieved. This research 
indicates the vulnerable areas to counterfeit alcohol and further research in these 
locations could be beneficial.  
2 There is a lack of resources available to Trading Standards and Environmental Health 
Offices due to local government controls on expenditure. These controls make 
anything other than a reactive approach to counterfeit alcohol unlikely.  
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3 The costs of investigation and prosecution must be met by the local authority and this 
seems to result in only prosecuting those cases that are large and significant enough, 
as investigation and prosecution costs are high.  
4 The lack of knowledge in relation to the production, or sourcing, of counterfeit alcohol 
makes it difficult to investigate. The case study used in this research indicates that 
networks appear flexible and can mutate effectively to establish on-going distribution 
networks. The lack of knowledge as to the origin of the ‘product’ makes stopping the 
flow of counterfeit alcohol extremely challenging.  
5 It is not possible at the moment to know the scale of the problem. It may be that the 
importation and production of counterfeit alcohol is episodic and not a significant 
problem as the seizure data would suggest. However, the seizure data could be 
extremely partial and not provide a good overall assessment. Whilst the seizure data 
seem to be relied upon by some regulators to assess the extent of the problem, the 
actual extent of the problem remains unclear. There is a danger of both under-




There is a need to attempt to accurately estimate the size of the counterfeit alcohol 
market in the UK. This would provide an indication of the size of counterfeit alcohol 
markets. Particular attention should be paid to areas that are vulnerable to the sale of 
counterfeit alcohol. It is critical to assist regulators in developing an investigative strategy 
that will be enhanced by an increase of investigative resources, clear lines of authority in 
any multi-agency investigation, and a sharing of investigative costs. There is an 
importance in regulatory bodies having a clear strategic vision in relation to counterfeit 
alcohol in the immediate future that is designed to limit market expansion. This would 
enable the development of a coherent and strategically joined up approach to the policing 
of illicit alcohol markets. There is little understanding of the market in smuggled alcohol 
and whether there is an overlap with the markets in counterfeit alcohol. This could be 
improved via further research in relation to smuggled alcohol where supply chain 






Project aims, methods and design 
 
Project Aims and Context  
 
The aim of this project was to: 
 
1 Provide a greater understanding of the social factors that influence counterfeit alcohol 
distribution and consumption. 





The report on the Economic Cost of Infringement in Spirits and Wines issued by the 
European Union Intellectual Property Office (July 2016) states that the UK has lost circa 
€197,000,000 due to counterfeit wines and spirits. Most significantly, seizure data shows 
that counterfeit alcohol, some of which is fake and injurious to health, has been 
produced, distributed and sold in the UK. However, the illegal nature of the production, 
distribution and consumption of counterfeit alcohol inhibits a clear estimate of the extent 
of the problem, leaving gaps on our knowledge about how the production and distribution 
of counterfeit alcohol is organised.  
 
The aim of the research project is to provide greater understanding of the distribution and 
the consumption of counterfeit alcohol through the investigation of networks involved in 
the distribution of counterfeit alcohol in order to ensure market penetration – that is, how 
networks develop and are organised and the interdependency between the different 
distribution points. Understanding the market for counterfeit alcohol, and in particular, the 
process of distribution, enables an understanding of the localised nature of how 
counterfeit alcohol distribution is organised and how locally organised groups are 
networked with wider networks of distribution (see Hobbs 1998 for an  explanation  of  
the  local  and  the  global). Furthermore, the research project explores the markets for 
counterfeit alcohol through data collection on the consumption of counterfeit alcohol as a 
means of understanding the purchasing decisions of consumers, as well as how the 
demand in the market is structured and exploited by those selling counterfeit alcohol. In 
so doing, the project adopted a criminological approach and social network analysis in 
order to increase our knowledge of how distribution is organised, the purchasing 
decisions of consumers and the interaction between demand and consumption in the 
illicit market of counterfeit alcohol. 
 
The project developed over a period of 24 months providing quarterly reports on the 
activities and outputs of the project. The project was divided into three stages. In the first 
stage, ethical clearance was obtained in accordance with the University’s regulations, in 
addition to conducting desk research on the data publicly available and creating lists of 
potential participants/persons to contact once ethical clearance was provided.  
 
Furthermore, we created an expert group inviting representatives from the authorities, the 
industry and academics. We held a meeting with the expert group to discuss the project’s 
aims and objectives as well as our preliminary understanding of the problem and findings 
on the sector. The expert group provided useful feedback on the priorities, problems and 
approaches from each of the sectors represented in the group, which were used to 
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inform the data collection process. The second stage involved the collection of data 
through the requests for information to local authorities, interviews and surveys. The third 
stage entailed the collation and analysis of the data collected in the first and second 
stages of the project. The final report includes the research findings and 




Recently there have been seizures of counterfeit alcohol in the UK and Ireland. Operation 
OPSON, a EUROPOL and INTERPOL joint operation between October 2014 and 
January 2015 discovered over a quarter of a million litres of drinks recovered across all 
regions. Similar results were posted by Operation OPSON VII in April 2018 (see 
EUROPOL 2018). During OPSON VI counterfeit alcohol was among the most seized 
product, and in the UK, a plant making fake brand-name vodka was raided. There were 
over 20,000 empty bottles ready for filling. There was evidence that antifreeze was used 
as there were a large number of empty five-litre containers as well as a reverse osmosis 
unit used to remove the chemical's colour and smell from the antifreeze. In March 2015 
the investigation of a pub landlord in Consett for selling fake vodka was widely reported 
(http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/pub-landlord-who-sold-dangerous-5355834). In 
August of 2015 it was reported that 130,000 litres of counterfeit vodka were discovered in 
Widnes (The Grocer 2015), and since August there have been further prosecutions 
(Teeside News 2015). In December 2015 a cross-border operation (UK/Ireland) 
discovered a counterfeit vodka plant in Co Louth, Ireland (ITV 2015) In 2011 five 
Lithuanian men died in an explosion when the still they were using to manufacture 
alcohol exploded and ‘three lorry loads of spirits falsely labelled as Smirnoff were found 
nearby.’ (BMJ 2012). The frequency of press reports, public alerts and the scale of 
seizures indicate that this is an issue of significant public concern. McKee et al (2012) in 
the BMJ stated that many counterfeit alcohols: 
 
“…are similar in composition to the products they imitate, and the major risk to 
health probably comes from excessive consumption of ethanol because of the 
cheap price. It is impossible to tell without testing, however, which of these 
products contain other potentially toxic contaminants.” (Editorial) 
 
In August 2017 there was a reported case of counterfeit alcohol in a public house in 
Northumberland. Two mainstream brands were seized and tested and found to be fake. 
The tests suggested that the alcohol was sourced from industrial alcohol and were 5.7% 
lower ABV than required by law. The relevant Trading Standards Authority were not able 
to estimate the size of the problem but were of the view that it was wider than the one 
public house discovered and prosecuted.  
 
These cases highlight one of the key problems in relation to the research of counterfeit 
alcohol; the extent of counterfeit alcohol placed into the legitimate market. The selling of 
counterfeit goods relies on two processes; first the purchaser knowing that the item, such 
as designer labelled clothes and fashion accessories, cannot be genuine at the price paid 
and is purchased to provide the appearance of the legitimate item. Second, that the 
purchaser is of the belief that the item they are purchasing, food and beverage for 
example, is what it claims to be. In the latter case the fraudulent good has to be placed 
into the legitimate market as legitimate product and this requires that the legitimate 
market is infiltrated by the fraudulent product at some vulnerable point that allows the 
product to be viewed as authentic. What the cases briefly outlined above indicate is that 
there is a flow of counterfeit alcohol into the legitimate market and that on occasions it is 
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discovered by Trading Standards. Therefore, it is problematic to assess the size of the 
counterfeit alcohol market from seizure data as it relies on a number of factors.  
• The priority that Trading Standards Offices are able to give to the detection of 
counterfeit alcohol. 
• Resources available to Trading Standards at a time of reduction of available resources 
that are not required to meet statutory requirements. 
• Priority given to counterfeit alcohol by HMRC in order to counter duty evasion. 
 
The cost of managing investigations can cut across several agencies (Trading 
Standards, Environmental Health, Police, HMRC) and can also have cross-jurisdictional 
(linking with other EU Member states) components. These multi-agency and cross-
jurisdictional investigations are expensive. In the UK these expenses fall to local 
government-based agencies that are on tightly managed budgets and with a relatively 
small pool of expertise, due to the on-going ‘austerity’ policy. The Food Crime Unit’s 
Strategic Assessment 2016 (FSA 2016) addresses issues of counterfeit alcohol with a 
focus on spirits. However, there is little reported other than seizures dating back to 2013 
and the suggestion that the production and distribution is linked to Eastern European 
Organised Crime Groups. However, there is little attention to counterfeit alcohol in other 
FSA publications. Due to the variations in the data it is not possible to accurately predict 
the amount of counterfeit alcohol on the market. The Food Crime Unit Strategic 
Assessment (FSA 2016) notes that the places where most seizures took place were in 
the North-West, Scotland, the Midlands and Northern Ireland, again this could be an 
artefact of variations in Trading Standards activity rather than accurately recording the 
location hotspots for counterfeit alcohol. The table below suggests that counterfeit 
alcohol is the fifth in the top ten products investigated by Trading Standards. This relies 
on only 44% of Trading Standards authorities responding, there is a lack of data for over 




Source: IP Crime and Enforcement Report 2017-2018:11 
 
One means of understanding with more clarity the market functions of counterfeit alcohol 
is to avoid the temptation to ‘size the market’ but rather to try and understand how 
distribution and consumption may occur. Consequently, one of the strategic approaches 
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of this project was to utilise available data from a regulator that provided data on a 
previous case. This also provided cross jurisdictional data and allowed for a social 
network analysis to be undertaken in order to understand the elements of distribution and 
market structure. 
 
Project Design and Methods 
 
The project was designed around three key elements.  
 
1 The first element of the design was the analysis of the case data to enable a case 
study to be further developed. This provided a detailed analysis of how the counterfeit 
alcohol was moved from the point of collection to the point of distribution. It has also 
been possible using seizure data linked to the case data to develop a framework to 
understand how the alcohol was distributed to a street level. The data also provides 
some indications of market penetration and calls into question how Trading 
Standards’ data may be analysed.  
2 The second element was to conduct a number of interviews with potential purchasers 
of counterfeit alcohol in order to gain some understanding of the purchasing decisions 
made by consumers. Interviews were also conducted with other stakeholders in order 
to understand regulatory responses to the problem of counterfeit alcohol.  
3 The final phase of the research was to undertake an on on-line search for potential 
outlets for counterfeit alcohol in order to develop an understanding of how counterfeit 






A useful mode of analysis for operationalising and developing systematic insight into 
‘how’ criminal enterprise, such as distributing counterfeit alcohol, is organised, is by 
deconstructing the nature of the crime commission process and the actors involved to 
gain a more comprehensive understanding of the mechanics, actors and processes 
involved. This has been termed ‘script’ analysis (Cornish 1994) and has been recognised 
as a successful approach to developing analytical and prevention-focused thinking to 
disrupt the behaviors of organised criminals (Levi and Maguire 2004, 429). The 
framework enables “a careful and comprehensive analysis of the nature of the problem to 
be addressed, including developing a clear understanding of the various crime scenes, 
actors and their resources” (Levi and Maguire 2004, 457).  In brief, script analysis 
provides a way of generating, organising and systematising knowledge about the 
procedural aspects and procedural requirements of crime commission. It has the 
potential to provide more appropriately crime-specific accounts of crime commission, and 
to extend this analysis to all the stages of the crime-commission sequence (Cornish 
1994, 160 emphasis in original).  
 
Thus, script analysis involves deconstructing a. what has to be done, b. by whom, and c. 
under which conditions in order to be able to carry out particular goal-oriented criminal 
activities and enterprise. For Cornish (1994, 157), criminal behaviour can be routinised, 
making it appear simplistic, but this routine can conceal key aspects of the organisation, 
sequencing and acquisition of crimes. Scripts therefore provide a way of understanding 
the logistical steps (not necessarily linear or sequential, allowing for flexibility and actor 
innovation) that take place across different scenes. Within each ‘scene’, different 
permutations of the ‘facets’ that make up the different ways the behaviours can be 
accomplished can be found. Underpinning the script approach is an assumption of 
rational choice for understanding offending behaviours and decisions that can be 
prevented by intervening with the larger situations or environments within which they take 
place (Clarke and Cornish 1985). Thus, the logic behind the approach is that criminality is 
understood as rational, goal-oriented and purposive behaviour and that by understanding 
the procedural aspects of these behaviours, suitable intervention mechanisms can be 
mapped onto their scripts. The script analysis approach has been persuasively applied to 
a range of criminal enterprises such as: drug manufacturing in clandestine laboratories 
(Chiu, Leclerc, and Townsley 2011), the online stolen data market (Hutchings and Holt 
2015), human trafficking for sexual exploitation (Savona, Giommoni, and Mancuso 2013), 
infiltration by the Mafia of the public construction industry (Savona 2010), the switching of 
Vehicle Identification Numbers from wrecked to stolen vehicles (Tremblay, Talon, and 
Hurley 2001), illegal waste activity (Thompson and Chainey 2011; Sahramäki et al. 2017) 
and in conjunction with social network analysis in relation to stolen-vehicle exportation 
operations (Morselli and Roy 2008) and the distribution of counterfeit alcohols (Lord et al. 
2017). The increasing use of this approach in relation to serious and complex crimes 
reflects the simple yet effective way through which the complete sequence of actions and 
decisions across all stages of crime commission can be identified, thereby giving a fuller 
range of possible intervention points that has clear crime reduction and disruption 
potential for law enforcement and regulatory authorities. 
 
For example, in a case of credit card fraud, various things need doing, such as obtaining 
credit card details, using the details to make purchases, laundering or using the profit or 
goods obtained, finding people to trust to aid collaboration, and so on. In a script analysis 
each of these different stages are the ‘scenes’. ‘Scenes’ can be carried out in different 
ways that are defined as ‘tracks’. For instance, for credit card fraud, Scene 1 – ‘Obtain 
Credit Card Details’ and we could do this either by skimming the card details of someone 
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in a restaurant (Track 1), or by making a false application to a bank (Track 2), or by 
phishing on a website for potential victims (Track 3) – there are many tracks. In essence, 
we can apply this mode of thinking to any organised crime by breaking down what we 
know about the crime into different scenes and tracks, and thinking about the actors 
involved and the conditions that were conducive to the crime. The purpose of doing this 
is that it allows us to build a fuller theoretical account of the nature of criminal activities 
but also to identify key points of vulnerability for intervention by law enforcement e.g. 
where are the weak points in the crime? 
 
Structure of fieldwork 
 
Our above mentioned script analysis was informed through data collected via multiple 
methods during the fieldwork phase that was structured around three main areas: 
information on seizures of counterfeit alcohol collected through requests for information 
to the authorities, the conduction of interviews to stakeholders (i.e. local authorities, the 
police, wholesalers and consumers), and surveys to consumers in different locations. 
The fieldwork also includes information publicly available such as reports, newspaper 
articles on seizures/prosecutions related to counterfeit alcohol, relevant legislation and 
regulation, and online availability of cheap alcohol.   
 
Information on seizures of counterfeit alcohol 
 
A letter requesting information about seizures of counterfeit alcohol in the last five years 
was sent to UK local authorities through the Programme Director of the National Trading 
Standards, Director of Policy, Association of Chief Trading Standards Officers (ACTSO). 
We received six replies in relation to the information request providing information on the 
date of seizure, the kind of alcohol, and actions taken. One of the local authorities 




Data was collected through interviews conducted to local authorities, wholesalers and 
consumers. Through secondary resources, specifically, newspapers, we had access to 
information about reported cases of seizures/prosecutions of counterfeit alcohol. Local 
authorities involved in the investigations were contacted by email to request an interview 
to discuss the information. The response from the local authorities was generally positive 
giving access to information about documented investigations on counterfeit alcohol. 
However, not every local authority responded to our request. The information collected 
through the request for information to local authorities and interviews to diverse 
authorities enabled us to make connections between diverse seizures, the kind of alcohol 
and locations where it was available.  
 
Through an online search, a list of wholesalers was gathered and requests for interviews 
were sent by email. Likewise, request for interviews were sent to the student population. 
Even though the response from wholesalers was not optimal, one wholesaler agreed to 
speak at length with us about the industry. Likewise, we had access to interviews with 
consumers, particularly, the student population, which provided us with valuable 




We conducted surveys on the streets in sectors known for their student population, the 
potential availability of counterfeit alcohol (derived from information in interviews) and/or 
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their pub/nightlife experience. Surveys were conducted late in the afternoon or early in 
the evening when people were getting ready or going out for the night. Surveys enabled 
us to gather information about purchasing decisions, for instance, whether people were 
buying and consuming counterfeit alcohol knowingly, the locations where cheap (and 
potentially counterfeit) alcohol was available, and some of the rationales that drive the 
purchase of cheap and/or counterfeit alcohol. 
 
The surveys show that consumers make purchasing decisions based on, firstly, price and 
secondly, particular brands. The majority of participants responded affirmatively to the 
question of whether they bought cheap alcohol. When asked why they thought the 
alcohol was cheap, the majority of respondents taught the alcohol was cheap because it 
was firstly, an unknown brand; secondly, counterfeit; thirdly, end of stock; and, lastly, 
smuggled. The surveys show that individuals consume counterfeit alcohol knowingly in 
diverse locations, but mostly in party with friends and festivals and outdoors events. In 
some occasions, individuals consumed counterfeit alcohol even when this was evident 
from the labels or it had been bought explicitly as such; other respondents taught the 
alcohol was too cheap to be authentic, but still consumed it.  The locations to purchase 
counterfeit alcohol varied, with the surveys indicating that off-licences, online, takeaways 
and taxis were the most likely locations to find/purchase counterfeit alcohol.  These 
outcomes will be dealt with in more detail below on the analysis of the market for the 




Further data was collected through online searches, for instance, public reports on the 
consumption of alcohol, regulatory enforcement and regional strategies to name a few.  
Furthermore, information about the online offer and sale of alcohol was also collected, 
noticing the increasing number of outlets offering discounted/cheap alcohol online or 




Access to data on counterfeit alcohol presents difficulties due to the illicit nature of the 
activity. On some occasions, problems were encountered engaging willing participants to 
provide information on the alcohol industry. This problem was more noticeable with 
wholesalers and retailers, particularly, off-licences. In the case of wholesalers, some of 
the most well-known wholesalers were contacted to request an interview; however, 
request were not answered or refused on the grounds that as a matter of policy these 
businesses do not engage in research. Off-licences were visited to request an interview 
with business owners, inclusive of businesses in areas identified by consumers as 
sectors were counterfeit alcohol was potentially available. Nevertheless, the majority of 
off-licences were uncooperative. Indeed, in one occasion, a business owner had agreed 
to be interviewed only to retract on the date of the interview, even though assurances 
were given that the information was not going to be shared with the police and/or the 
local authorities. There seems to be a reluctance to speak about the industry either as a 
precaution not to reveal information to the local authorities/police, or not to provide data 
about the industry to outsiders.  A few participants agreed to discuss the issues as long 
as it remained ‘off the record’, this enables us to gather a better understanding of the 
context of problem/industry, even though we are unable to quote the data directly. 
However, we had access to a well-known wholesaler who was open to speak about the 
industry at length, as well as access to documented cases of seizures of counterfeit 




Through interviews with consumers, the researchers identified potential locations where 
counterfeit alcohol could be found. These areas were visited to identify the kind of alcohol 
that was on offer; however, there was no evidence of the counterfeit alcohol at the time. It 
is unknown whether counterfeit alcohol is available on the shelves or whether it has to be 
requested from under the counter, particularly as the research indicates that the 
information on the availability of counterfeit alcohol is often transmitted through word of 
mouth by consumers. 
 
Surveys were conducted targeting diverse sectors known for their student populations, 
the potential access to counterfeit alcohol, or their pub/nightlife culture. Younger 
generations were more likely to participate than older drinkers, therefore, the range of 
ages for participants were mostly in their 20s and 30s as opposed to 40s to 60s. 
However, in terms of gender, participation was balanced. It is worth noticing the reaction 
of one of the participants who accepted to participate on the survey insofar as the survey 
was not aimed at collecting information for the implementation of the MUP. Despite these 
problems, the researchers had access to interviews, local authorities’ seizure information, 




The case study and getting to grips with production 
 
Defining Counterfeit Alcohol 
 
There are a number of illicit alcohols available, but there are differences between them. 
There are clandestinely distilled spirits that are made as a form of localised industry. 
Some cultures have a long tradition of illegal distillation, for example Ireland has a long 
history for the brewing of poitín – a spirit traditionally made with potatoes. This form of 
illicit alcohol was brewed to evade the payment of duty, in the Irish case, to an imperial 
power, the British. Historically the markets tended to be highly localised and relatively 
small. Other countries also have traditions of distilling illicit alcohol. For example, in Spain 
“aguardiente” (firewater) is a common local spirit made from the grape skins after they 
have been pressed in winemaking. Poland also has a history of illicit alcohol distillation 
and is commonly made from plums (Slivovitz). 
 
There have been cases in the UK of illegal stills being discovered, usually after a 
dramatic event such as an explosion. In 2011 there was a large explosion at an industrial 
estate in Boston Lincolnshire where an illegal still exploded killing five men working there. 
The men were migrant workers from Lithuania. The indication in this case was that this 
still was organised and distilling illicit alcohol for more than just a localised market. There 
are few incidents of stills exploding but the presence of such stills suggests that there is a 
market for illicit spirit.  
 
The other major source of illicit alcohol is smuggled alcohol. The alcohol is sourced in a 
tax jurisdiction with lower duty and brought into the UK and sold at a cheaper price. 
There are few reported cases, the smuggling usually involves the re-direction of alcohol 
from a legitimate destination to an illicit destination where the goods are then distributed 
to small off licences, corner shops and pubs. The alcohol is legitimate but the duty has 
been evaded.  
 
There are three types of illicit alcohol; first, alcohol that is converted from denatured 
alcohol, or illegally distilled in significant quantities and bottled as a legitimate brand and 
distributed as such but is counterfeit. Second, alcohol, that is illegally distilled and is 
distributed as such, but on a localised and small scale. The distribution of such alcohol is 
via friendship and work based networks. Third, alcohol that is legitimate but where the 
duty has been evaded, usually smuggled from a cheaper low tax jurisdiction to one 
where tax levels are higher. This alcohol is mainly distributed using commercial small 






The case study is based on data obtained from a regulator’s investigatory files. The 
regulators were also available for interview. The case study explores two events of 
importation of counterfeit vodka from one jurisdiction to another. The vodka was 
discovered after a truck was searched in relation to the first event and the second event 






A truck was searched at the port of entry. The manifest indicated that the load was 
bottled water. The ‘water’ was wrapped in black plastic and when inspected it was found 
to be counterfeit vodka of a well-known brand.  
 
The load had been commissioned by a third party, probably acting on behalf of the 
owners of the consignment. The third party had simply asked a logistics company for the 
price of moving the consignment of ‘bottled water’ from A to B. The logistics company 
had then sub-contracted the load. This is usual business procedure in the logistics 
industry with contracts being sold on a number of times before an actual haulier carries 
the load. In this case the load was sub-contracted a number of times and the final haulier 
was at least 5 steps away from the original logistics company engaged and so the haulier 
had no knowledge of the third party who was party to the initial contract. This process 
placed distance between the haulier and the commissioner of the load. One 
consequence of this approach was that the consignment had little protection whilst it was 
being transported and was vulnerable to detection. Once the consignment was detected 
the ‘exporters’ were required to change their strategy and developed a more 




The network of the distribution group devised a complex structure to ensure the 
protection of the individuals and the consignments. A person with logistics know-how and 
legitimacy in the logistics marketplace was engaged to organise the transportation of the 
counterfeit vodka. The counterfeit product was collected by the logistics node from a 
storage location and delivered to legitimate logistic providers. The ‘logistics node’ had 
legitimate access to these providers and the consignments raised no questions by the 
logistics providers.   
 
The counterfeit vodka was labelled as water and placed with a logistics provider who 
moved the counterfeit vodka, from jurisdiction A to jurisdiction B. The counterfeit product 
was then delivered to a holding address, on arrival it was redirected to a food wholesaler. 
Once delivered the consignment could be split into small consignments for distribution.  
The network is more structured and sophisticated as it relies on the know-how and skills 
of particular actors. The logistics knowledge and the legitimate access to logistic 
companies and networks provided good cover for the counterfeit vodka as it became part 
of a groupage load and thus less likely to be discovered. However, in placing the 
counterfeit vodka in the legitimate logistics network the owners of the counterfeit vodka 
lose control of the commodity. Control of the counterfeit vodka is regained once the 
delivery of the load is redirected to the food wholesaler. The food wholesaler also 
provides legitimate access into the food service industry and can either offer ‘cheap’ 
vodka or can place the counterfeit product into the legitimate market. The structure of the 
distribution network suggests that there are relatively easy ways to move counterfeit 
vodka between jurisdictions and that the risks of apprehension are low.  
 
Understanding the production of counterfeit alcohol 
 
Data on the production of counterfeit alcohol is elusive. There appear to be a number of 
ways in which it is produced from reported cases, these have been mentioned above. 
However, there is a lack of data to assist in estimating the most prevalent forms of 
production, as reported cases are sporadic and provide no cohesive account of the 
amount of counterfeit alcohol produced from different forms of production.  
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There is evidence of illegal distillation; however, this form of production is fraught with 
risks, in particular illegal stills are often located in what are usually makeshift premises, 
as they are available and the clandestine nature of production results in the location 
being that of friends or unscrupulous landlords. The lack of basic health and safety can 
result in a build-up of vapour which is highly flammable, and this has been the cause of a 
number of fatal explosions in the UK. The most recent being in Leicester in February 
2018 (BBC News:2018) . The other case is that of the explosion in Boston, Lincolnshire 
where there were also fatalities. The organisation of these illicit sites suggests that they 
were producing significant amounts of alcohol that was then sold as a leading brand 
vodka. Sites have also been discovered where denatured alcohol has the colouring 
removed in order to make it clear, it is then diluted and bottled as leading brand spirits.  
 
Both of these forms of production require large premises, know-how and equipment in 
order to produce the counterfeited product. There are considerable risks attached to 
these enterprises. In the case of illegal distillation there is the risk of explosion and injury, 
there are other risks too in terms of the problems of concealing the activity and the 
greater possibility of detection and apprehension.  
A script analysis of these two forms of production highlights the following: 
 
Illegal Distillation Denatured Alcohol 
 Illegal Distillation Denatured Alcohol 
Available Premises x x 
Access to relevant 
equipment 
xx xx 
   
Access to ingredients xxx xx 
Technical Know how xx xx 
Initial Start-up Capital x x 
Available Labour to 
facilitate Production 
x xx 





x = Important, xx=Very important, xxx=Critical to operation 
 
The physical, know-how and financial resources required to both these forms of 
production are relatively low. There is a requirement for significant investment by those 
managing the operation and the risks of detection are high due to the clandestine nature 
of the operation and its static form of production, being located in one place.  
The analysis of the case study data indicated that counterfeit alcohol could be produced 
by purchasing industrial alcohol or acquiring alcohol from a legitimate distillery in a 
different jurisdiction. The industrial alcohol enters the jurisdiction where it is to be 
counterfeited legitimately as industrial alcohol. The customs and excise regulations are 
much less robust than for alcohol for consumption. This industrial alcohol is diluted and 
bottled as a leading brand and this operation is more flexible than either illegal distillation 






 Illegal Distillation Denatured Alcohol Diluted 
Industrial 
Alcohol 
Available Premises x x  
Premises for 
bottling 
  xxx 
Access to relevant 
equipment 
xx xx x 
Access to 
ingredients 
xxx xx  
Sourcing distilled 
alcohol for dilution 
  xxx 
Technical Know 
How 
xx xx  
Initial Start-up 
Capital 
x x xx 
Available Labour to 
facilitate Production 




x x xx 
Sourcing counterfeit 
bottles and labels 
xxx xxx xxx 
 
Table 1 
x = Important, xx=Very Important, xxx=Critical to operation 
 
The premises required for bottling can be movable and located in more remote areas. 
This reduces the chances of detection as the place of bottling is not always in the same 
location. The only ingredients required are the distilled alcohol and water for dilution. 
There is little know-how required in ensuring that the dilution is one of alcohol to three of 
water. The importation of the counterfeit alcohol can be managed in such a way as to 
ensure there is a distance between importation, bottling and distribution. The dilution of 
industrial alcohol has far less risk attached and is an easier process to manage. It is also 
easier for the counterfeiting process to remain clandestine.  
 
The case study data suggests that there is a clear demarcation between the production 
and distribution of counterfeit alcohol. It is not necessary for the same people to be 
involved in both activities. The data from the case study includes the following scenario. 
The counterfeit vodka was collected by the logistics node in the network. The location of 
the collection point was never made available (possibly because no one asked the 
question). The logistics node delivers the counterfeit vodka to the logistic hub. Therefore, 
the origin, authenticity and provenance of the vodka were never brought into question. 
The logistic node was working for the owners of the vodka, however, it is also unclear 
from the case study data how and when they acquired the vodka, they may have been 
involved in its importation, dilution and bottling or they may have bought the consignment 




Gaining insight to the production of counterfeit vodka is elusive. The analysis 
demonstrates that the strategy with least risk is to purchase industrial alcohol, or distilled 
alcohol, and dilute, bottle and distribute. Every other strategy has higher levels of risk 
attached, however, there is a lack of data that can draw on a series of cases studies to 







The findings from the project can be divided into three distinct areas; the distribution of 
counterfeit alcohol, the consumption of counterfeit alcohol and the structure of the 
markets in counterfeit alcohol. Interviews were conducted with Trading Standards 
Officers who had been involved in seizures of counterfeit alcohol, and with consumers.  
 
There were difficulties in obtaining interviews with Trading Standard Departments where 
no seizures had been made, they considered it not relevant and not a specific issue to 
their work. HMRC were also approached and a request for them to be involved in the 




The seizure of counterfeit alcohol was in every case in the form of vodka. It is the easiest 
of the spirits to counterfeit as it is generally of little taste and clear. In Case A the vodka 
was an own brand. The brand is available to independent retailers. The brand owners 
provide purchasing services to independent grocery retailers to enable them to be 
competitive in what is a highly competitive marketplace. A customer bought two bottles of 
the retailer’s own brand and because ‘she was not getting drunk on it’ she returned to the 
shop and the owner Mr AG ignored her complaint and so the customer went to Trading 
Standards. The retailer was ‘known’ to Trading Standards inasmuch that there had been 
a previous incident concerning the sale of past sell by date foodstuffs. In Case B (located 
in a popular holiday town) there had been a number of seizures over a three year period 
from various premises. The vodka was counterfeit of a popular cheap brand. The source 
of the fake vodka in Case B was difficult to locate and there was a gathering of 
intelligence over the three year period that allowed for Trading Standards to set up a 
purchase of the fake vodka. In Case C Trading Standards received intelligence that a 
local taxi driver was selling vodka, wine and cigarettes from the back of the taxi. The 
vodka was counterfeit and was a brand of a large Cash and Carry company. In each of 
the cases the vodka was of a low price brand. In the case study (above) the vodka was 
also one of the low priced brands and a mainstream vodka brand.  
 
• Finding: Cheaper brands, and ‘own brand’ vodka appear to be the most vulnerable to 
counterfeiting. One Trading Standards officer expected luxury brands to be more 
vulnerable, however, there is no indication of this from the data.  
• Finding: Trading Standards officers appear to rely on intelligence in cases of 
counterfeit alcohol or on a consumer complaint. There is no case where the counterfeit 
vodka was discovered through routine visits to retailers. In the Case Study the vodka 
was discovered by the officer being ‘sharp eyed’ in seeing counterfeit packaging.  
 
In each of the cases (A, B and C) there was no data on how the retailers and taxi driver 
were supplied. In Case A the store owner had purchased the vodka cheaply from a 
wholesaler some 200 miles away. The retailer was able to provide an invoice for the 
transaction. The wholesaler existed but the invoice was ‘fake’. The wholesaler did not sell 
the brand in question so confirming the invoice as fake. The vodka was delivered to the 
purchaser by ‘a man in a white van’. In Case B where the Trading Standards officer 
posed as a customer, he was able to arrange for the delivery of the vodka to what would 
be considered a legitimate site. The vodka was ordered via phone and it was delivered, it 




“..they didn’t suspect anything different from their daily duties, really. Deliver 
alcohol to off-licences, on-licenses and hotels in the area” (TSO B) 
 
As Trading Standards were investigating the case the trade ceased and so the 
investigation halted. Sometime later the trade resumed and again an order was placed, 
but they refused to deliver, and it had to be collected from a local convenience store. In 
Case C a similar pattern is evident: 
 
“He was adamant that he was supplied by a white van driver and he had a 
telephone number he phoned…. obviously he knew the people. He said that was 
the way it happened and how to get hold of the alcohol.” (TSO C) 
 
In cases B and C it was evident that the vendors of the alcohol, a taxi driver and the 
undercover operation engaged in by Trading Standards that the counterfeit alcohol was 
in a regularised supply chain. This suggests that there is a flow of supply. The taxi driver 
had a store, a garage lock-up, and it was suspected he had a regular customer base: 
 
“We don’t know whether he had regular customers or whether he was selling 
generically to anyone who got in the back of his cab. We think he was selling to 
regular customers, people he knew.” (TSO C) 
 
A taxi provides a legitimate cover for the sale of illicit alcohol and other goods. A taxi 
raises little suspicion when it is about late at night and can enter all areas of a city without 
raising any suspicions of individuals or the police. 
  
In Case B the delivery was by a white van going about legitimate business. This 
highlights how counterfeit goods are integrated into the mainstream activity and appear 
legitimate. This was also the case in Case A where the store owner bought the correct 
brand but not from the usual source. In some respects, alcohol has to be integrated into 
the legitimate market to ensure it has a level of authenticity. Consumers might be wary of 
buying counterfeit alcohol, more so than counterfeit cigarettes1.  
 
• Finding: The distribution of counterfeit alcohol is a very opaque supply chain and it is 
difficult for Trading Standards officers to trace back more than one step. This hinders 
prosecution and makes the understanding of distribution networks complicated.  
• Finding: If the distribution network is opaque and complicated to map owing to lack of 
information it makes the production networks very hard to access.  
• Finding: The integration of counterfeit alcohol into the market as ‘legitimate’ product is 
critical. Therefore, it can be difficult to locate the point of deception. In Case A was the 
shop owner deceived at the point of purchase or did he know that the alcohol was 
counterfeit because of the price? 
• Finding: There are certain activities that provide a cover for illicit distribution, taxis and 
also delivery vans delivering legitimate goods to businesses.  
• Finding: The distribution methods make it complex to trace the supply chain back from 
the point of delivery. 
  
 





Investigating the distribution of counterfeit alcohol is time consuming and expensive. For 
many Trading Standards offices it is not a high priority: 
 
“What is the current priority level on counterfeit alcohol in your jurisdiction?” 
 
“We are not looking for it. If it is brought to our attention we will do something about 
it. But we are not looking for it.” (TSO A).  
 
Another Trading Standards officer commented: 
 
“The challenges specifically now are resourcing…with regard to the current 
situation regarding the cuts to local authorities and then to Trading Standards...We 
have a diminishing pool of officers who have the expertise to deal with that type of 
work...we don’t have the resources and the staffing levels we once used to have.” 
(TSO B) 
  
The Trading Standards Officer in Case C commented: 
 
“The challenges, I think it is the resource issue of trading standards, and it is like that 
across most of the country. The Trading Standards offices in this area had 53 
officers now they have 13...you are not going to have the same level of enforcement 
and investigation.” (TSO C) 
 
• Finding: Recent cut backs to Local Authority funding have impacted on the capacity of 
Trading Standards to investigate activities other than those which receive a high 
priority. This can make the distribution of counterfeit alcohol less risky for those 
engaged in this activity. 
 
In Case B the supply of counterfeit alcohol ceased for a few months. It was unclear 
whether this was because there was a concern by the distributor that they were being 
watched, or whether their supply chain broke down. The Trading Standards officer 
thought it might be that the source was raided and so the supply chain was disrupted.  
 
“I was never unfortunately able to find for circumstances how the operation was 
being run...The hunch is that it might be connected to the bigger jobs.” (TSO B) 
 
What is consistent across the three cases described here is that it was very difficult for 
Trading Standards officers to explore the distribution system as they were never able to 
trace the source back more than one step. However, the case study does provide some 





Consumption of counterfeit alcohol 
 
The research shows that there is a market for the consumption of counterfeit alcohol. 
Even though more specific information about the profile of consumers remains unknown, 
the data collected indicates that the purchase of cheap (and potentially counterfeit) 
alcohol is mostly driven by economic factors, where price ranks highly as one of the main 
factors taken into account when making purchasing decisions. As the rationale is mainly 
economic, the consumption of counterfeit alcohol affects certain types of consumers 
more than others, different age groups, the lack of access to economic resources and 
location. These factors are important indicators of viable markets for the distributors and 
sellers of counterfeit alcohol. Furthermore, the market for the consumption of counterfeit 
alcohol is affected by changing purchasing patterns (e.g. the Internet and takeaways 
(24/7 delivery services)). Consumers have access to counterfeit alcohol through different 
sources, some of whom purchase and consume counterfeit alcohol knowingly.  
 
Types of consumer 
 
The research identified different types of consumers determined for example by age 
group (i.e. student populations and older ‘committed’ drinkers). The research indicates 
that student populations were more open to discuss their purchasing decisions, and 
therefore, the consumption of counterfeit alcohol, both knowingly and unwittingly.  
Economic factors were usually cited as one of the main reasons to purchase cheap (and 
potentially counterfeit) alcohol. However, there were other factors that drove the 
consumption of counterfeit alcohol amongst students. The consumption of counterfeit 
alcohol seems to be related to a drinking culture where certain age groups have tried 
counterfeit alcohol as part of a group. Moreover, the consumption of counterfeit alcohol 
amongst students seems to be linked to heavy drinking practices where cheap (and 
potentially counterfeit) alcohol is a means to the objective of getting drunk. 
 
“it is usually pre-drinks or before we go to the bar. We usually start drinking 
beforehand, that is usually when I got to buy alcohol” (Consumer B) 
 
This respondent had seen counterfeit alcohol at events described. When asked how they 
knew it was counterfeit they replied: 
 
“I have seen a few bottles of (Brand) where the name is spelt wrongly. The label is 
a bit weird, you can tell it is not real” (Consumer B). 
 
Pressures to consume counterfeit alcohol as part of a group, whilst daunting the first 
time, seem to become normalised insofar as nobody feels ill or there are no fatal 
consequences, further turning into other counterfeited products such as tobacco. 
Amongst these student groups, the consumption of counterfeit alcohol will take place 
during drinking sessions prior to an evening out. Respondents mentioned that on some 
occasions counterfeit alcohol would have been purchased knowingly. The sourcing of 
counterfeit alcohol appears to take place via word of mouth. This is the way in which the 
respondents gained knowledge of where to purchase counterfeit alcohol. Local corner 
shops known for selling counterfeit alcohol were identified by word of mouth. Online 
sources were also shared in this way. Respondents were aware of the counterfeit nature 
of the alcohol as it was evident from basic mistakes on the bottles. Some respondents 
considered that the consumption of counterfeit alcohol could also occur unknowingly 
through the purchase of cheap branded alcohol, or through consumption at venues such 




In this regard, older ‘committed’ drinkers seem to show some of the same behaviours as 
those of students. The purchase of cheap alcohol would be determined by economic 
factors (specifically price) as well as by a drinking culture. Whilst some would consume 
counterfeit alcohol knowingly (e.g. evident from the bottle or content), the potential 
consumption of counterfeit alcohol would be triggered by the purchase of cheap alcohol. 
There seems to be a perception that alcohol is cheap because it is a) an unknown brand; 
b) counterfeit; or, c) smuggled. These perceptions are interesting because they show 
some of the purchasing decisions that consumers make when buying alcohol and there 
are a number of observations that derive from these practices.  
 
First, well-known brands are not the only brands to be counterfeited. There are a number 
of cases affecting wholesaler’s brands. These brands share, with the well-known brands, 
being competitive on price and at the lower priced end of the market. Second, there have 
been seizures of unknown brands at production sites. The problem for counterfeiters in 
placing unknown brands into the market is that they meet resistance form consumers. It 
appears that consumers are wary of brands they have not encountered and are more 
considerate of known brands. This may be one reason why the lower priced, high volume 
brands are more vulnerable to counterfeiting. This observation raises an interesting 
question in relation to the psychology of consumers. Does an unknown brand suggest to 
consumers counterfeited product whereas a known brand with an obviously ‘dodgy’ label 
provides more reassurance as to authenticity?  Third, there is a perception amongst 
consumers that counterfeit alcohol is a victimless crime because cheap alcohol is 
smuggled, or duty evaded. Respondents suggested that counterfeit alcohol, particularly 
counterfeited brands would be expected to be found and consumed in other countries.  
 
Respondents suggested that counterfeit product would not be an issue in the UK. An 
explanation for this view could be that consumers have trust in a regulatory system that 
they consider provides protection from counterfeit goods. A further reason may be that 
the spread of counterfeit alcohol is not uniform across the country and so there are areas 
where no counterfeit product is found, even where suitable market conditions exist. It is 
also apparent that the purchasing of counterfeit alcohol is reliant on word of mouth 
consumer networks that not all respondents were able to access. Finally, price is an 
important driver for the consumption of counterfeit alcohol, there will be occasions in 
which counterfeit alcohol is placed in the market at a regular or marginally lower than 
average prices at retailers. Therefore, price does cause suspicion as to authenticity or 
provenance. A consumer would have to suspect that the purchase was not authentic, 
because of lower strength or a packaging error, to suspect that the alcohol is not 
genuine. If the seller has also bought the product in good faith (as in Case A) the 
discovery of the counterfeit product is unlikely. 
 
Areas of consumption (Locations) 
 
Economic drivers structure the market for consumption of counterfeit alcohol as there are 
populations that are more susceptible to purchasing cheap alcohol. An example of this 
are areas with a high number of student residents. Another example are less affluent 
economic areas where cheap alcohol provides savings and also access to alcohol that if 
the regular price is paid it lessens access by legitimate purchasing. Other areas that have 
a high concentration of transit population (e.g. some coastal cities/areas known for their 
night-life/festivals) that could be targeted as people visiting those areas may be looking 
for a ‘good experience’ as part of a drinking culture, therefore, being more exposed to 
cheap (and potentially counterfeit) alcohol. These populations may conflate, for example, 
students would be looking for cheaper or more affordable housing, this was reflected in 
one of the survey areas. 
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Less economically advantaged areas provide different retail outlets. There are more likely 
to be shops that are selling cheap food, close to the sell-by date or food of a poor quality. 
These shops tend to be independently owned and are not reliant on large supermarket 
supply chains. They purchase from Cash and Carries, food wholesalers and wherever 
they can source the products cheaply to maximise their profit. There are also more likely 
to be independent, small, off-licences selling alcohol as cheaply as possible. It is these 
outlets that are more vulnerable to selling illicit forms of alcohol. Smuggled alcohol that 
allows for a cheap re-sale or on occasions counterfeit spirits that can be accessed 
cheaply and sold cheaply but also at a profit. Therefore, not all residential areas are 
equally vulnerable to illicit alcohol. The market is stratified according to social class with 
the less economically advantaged areas being more vulnerable. It is likely that the 
purchasing decision is one made on price rather than authenticity or provenance. An 
analysis of seizure information supports this assertion that the markets are stratified in 
terms of economic well-being.  
   
Consumer trends: the internet and takeaway services 
 
Consumption patterns are changing with the Internet seemingly impacting on the 
purchase of alcohol. There is an increasing number of online purveyors that reflect the 
changes in consumers’ shopping behaviours. It is anticipated that the Internet market 
structure will bear a resemblance to the ‘real-time’ market. There will be on-line retailers 
who have integrated and verifiable supply chains direct from brewer or distiller or from 
authenticated sources of supply able to verify the provenance of the alcohol they sell. 
The linkage between on-line selling and the possibility of illicit alcohol is in the use of 
especially designed on-line alcohol delivery services that are available 24/7 and where 
the cost is low.  
 
There are numerous on-line alcohol providers located across all areas of the country. 
Many of the companies appear to have national coverage and those easily available on 
the web are no doubt suppliers with integrity and clear lines of supply that verify source. 
However, it would be possible for those distributing illicit alcohol to utilise web-based 
technologies as a means of extending their customer base. Whilst this is possible the 
research suggests that illicit alcohol is in most cases sourced via social networks and 
verification by word of mouth.  
 
The minimum unit price and the market for consumption of counterfeit alcohol 
 
The introduction of the minimum unit price (MUP) in Scotland on May 2018, and its 
potential introduction in England and Wales needs to be further addressed.  Whilst the 
impact of the MUP is beyond the scope of this research, there are a number of questions 
that require further assessment. Beyond the regulatory impact, consumers would most 
likely continue to search for cheap alcohol. Hence, it is unclear how the MUP would deter 
them from purchasing cheap (and potentially counterfeit) alcohol as consumers generally 
accepted that they would continue to purchase cheap alcohol despite its implementation.  
 
Consumers seem to have the perception that cheap alcohol would still be available, for 
instance, in off-licences. These perceptions raise interesting questions of whether there 
could be a link between the introduction of the MUP and an increase in the consumption 




one occasion a participant answered the survey only once the researcher had explained 
that the project was not focused on the introduction of the MUP, but on the 
consumption/distribution of counterfeit alcohol. This reaction to the MUP is interesting 
because it seems to be linked to the economic drivers and drinking culture that impact on 
the market for consumption of cheap (and potentially counterfeit alcohol). Whilst it is too 
early to assess the impact of the MUP, these questions would have to be addressed in 






The research shows that there are a number of problems in the regulation and 
enforcement of counterfeit alcohol – that is, from the fragmentation of regulation and 
enforcement to the lack of resources (beyond financial cuts). Likewise, there seems to be 
a general misperception that the consumption of counterfeit alcohol occurs because 
consumers believe that the alcohol is smuggled or stolen, and therefore a victimless 
crime; however, the research indicates that some consumers would purchase counterfeit 
(and potentially fake alcohol) knowingly.  Regulatory and enforcement approaches 
require a better understanding about the market for distribution and for the consumption 
of counterfeit alcohol in order to target their limited resources to the enforcement of 
crimes related to the production, distribution and sale of counterfeit alcohol.  
 
Regulatory and enforcement approaches to counterfeit alcohol 
 
Regulatory responses to counterfeit alcohol are reactive. Authorities would only act upon 
intelligence or a consumer complaint. Hence, the authorities rely on those purchasing the 
alcohol – either the business owner who is buying the alcohol from an unknown and 
unregistered seller (white van man) or from the consumer that in some cases would be 
looking for cheap alcohol. This reactive approach to the enforcement of counterfeit 
alcohol inhibits dealing with the roots of the problem as most likely the bottles of 
counterfeit alcohol would only be seized to protect the consumers, but only in very limited 
cases the authorities would have the resources and intelligence to pursue further 
investigations regarding the supply chain. These limitations derive from a number of 
factors.   
 
First, the fragmentation of regulation and the enforcement of counterfeit alcohol 
complicates the investigation and prosecution of cases of counterfeit alcohol. A number 
of authorities are dealing with counterfeit alcohol: HM Revenue and Costumes (HMRC) 
deals with duty evasion, whilst trading standards focuses on compliance with standards 
generally (inclusive of intellectual property issues) and environmental health foregrounds 
the safety of a product. Likewise, the police can be involved in investigations and 
prosecutions regarding counterfeit alcohol. This fragmentation requires coordination from 
every authority in order to pursue investigations and potential prosecutions. Despite 
efforts to increase coordination, diverse authorities prioritise the investigations of 
counterfeit alcohol differently. On one occasion, for example, a production site, where 
fake vodka was being produced with screen wash, was raided by the police in 
collaboration with trading standards. The police took the lead of the case as there was 
neither an intellectual property infringement (unknown brand) nor a safety concern as 
there was no evidence that the product was found at retail. However, so far the police 
investigations had not led to prosecutions. Thus, even when coordination exists, the 
enforcement and prosecution of counterfeit alcohol cases depend on the extent to which 
counterfeit alcohol is prioritised by the relevant authorities due to factors such as 
resources (both financial and in terms of expertise), the kind of intelligence available, and 
other priorities within their activities. A further issue involves which authorities have 
ownership of counterfeit alcohol investigations. For instance, counterfeiting involves 
concerns over health and safety (e.g. harms caused to persons consuming counterfeit 
products), consumer rights (e.g. the right purchase authentic products), fraud (e.g. 
deception for financial gain) and intellectual property (e.g. large brands losing profits). 
Correspondingly, counterfeit alcohols can fall within the remits of various agencies such 
as trading standards, local and national police, the Food Standards Agency and public 
health. Many of these agencies respond to the issue not as a criminal law issue but as a 
regulatory violation. Furthermore, even where criminal law enforcement agencies do take 
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on such cases, they have an internal perception within enforcement cultures of not being 
serious crimes when compared to other forms of criminal behaviour such as 
interpersonal violence, drug production and sales, or property theft. 
  
Second, the general perception seems to be that there is sufficient regulation in place to 
deal with the problems of counterfeit alcohol.  However, the problem is one of resources. 
Budgetary cuts have left local authorities with limited number of officers and financial 
resources to fulfil with their statutory obligations. The Food Standards Agency Annual 
Report on UK Local Authority Food Law Enforcement (1 April to 31 March 2017) 
highlights that 21% of local authorities had more than 20% of the new food 
establishments awaiting their initial inspection as regards standards. Therefore, local 
authorities have become more reactive to their statutory obligations, thus acting upon 
intelligence. The lack of resources has affected inspection powers, prolonging the time 
between inspections to business operators (corner shops and off-licences), particularly 
those considered to be low-risk. This creates opportunities for some traders/business 
owners to engage in deviant behaviours, where the risk of being caught is low, and if 
caught, the odds to be prosecuted remain limited.  The rationale being that business 
owners would most likely blame a distributor – a white van man – for supplying the 
deviant product, leaving the authorities without sufficient evidence/intelligence to continue 
investigations. Usually, once the brand owner confirms the content of the bottle is 
genuine and there are no safety concerns for the consumer, the case would be 
terminated with the seizure of the bottles and a warning for the business owner, except 
for cases involving a considerable amount of bottles and/or recurrent offenders, where 
licenses can be revised or revoked.  
 
Third, there is insufficient evidence to show the whole supply chain for counterfeit alcohol 
from production to point of sale. However, there seems to be a perception that the 
product is coming into the UK from elsewhere, most likely, Eastern European countries. 
This perception prevents taking a more proactive approach to the investigation of cases 
related to the production of counterfeit alcohol. Although there have not been many raids 
involving production sites, authorities have been able to identify a reduce number of 
production operations in the UK. In this regard, traceability requirements are inadequate 
to go back through the supply chain, particularly when business owners fail to comply 
with record keeping, or  use paper trail; or, as on one of the aforementioned cases, 
provide forged invoices, some of which from legitimate businesses operating across 
jurisdictions.  
 
Finally, the priority level of counterfeit alcohol depends on the jurisdiction as well on the 
level of the market where counterfeit alcohol is found. Evidence shows that whilst some 
jurisdictions continue to have counterfeit alcohol as a priority, other jurisdictions have 
shifted their priority to other products (e.g. tobacco) due to a decrease in the number of 
seizures. As economic factors can make some jurisdiction a ready-market for the sale of 
counterfeit alcohol, the priority for local authorities in these areas would remain high. 
However, whilst the number of seizures of counterfeit alcohol seems to have decreased, 
there is no certainty whether this tendency is due to a real decrement on the sale and 
consumption of counterfeit alcohol, or a result of the reduced number of, and the length 
of time between inspections, as a consequence of budgetary/staffing cuts.  Furthermore, 
the investigation of seizures of counterfeit alcohol would be prioritised depending on the 
level of the market where the counterfeit alcohol is found, in which the seizure of bottles 
at the point of retail would most likely not lead to a prosecution unless there is 
intelligence to link such seizure to a middle-market distributor or manufacturing case. 
Seizures may fulfil with the objective of protecting the consumer from potentially 
dangerous alcohol. Nevertheless, by taking the product out of the market, without more 
26 
 
stringent penalties for those involved in the sale of counterfeit alcohol, it will be difficult to 
deal with the roots of the problem in a market for the consumption of cheap (and 
potentially counterfeit) alcohol.  
 
Taking steps toward the regulation of counterfeit alcohol: new regulatory 
measures 
 
Regulators are taking steps to deal with problems of counterfeit alcohol through diverse 
measures, for instance, the introduction of the MUP in Scotland and the Alcohol 
Wholesaler Registration Scheme (AWRS). On 15 November 2017, the UK Supreme 
Court confirmed that the Alcohol (Minimum Pricing) (Scotland) Act 2012, which 
introduces the MUP is legal.  The MUP entered into force on 1 May 2018 as a means to 
address health issues resulting from heavy drinking in Scotland by ensuring that alcohol 
is sold at a sensible price. Since the MUP has been recently implemented, there is no 
evidence to determine whether the MUP will reduce the sale/consumption of cheap 
alcohol. One of the main concerns, and potential consequences of the implementation of 
the MUP, is the impact on the distribution, sale and consumption of counterfeit alcohol – 
that is, an increase on counterfeit alcohol (smuggled) or the emergence of alternative 
outlets to have access to counterfeit alcohol. These questions would have to be 
addressed in the future research, particularly if England and Wales were to introduce 
similar policies. 
  
Furthermore, HMRC introduced the AWRS in April 2017, where alcohol wholesalers 
need to be registered to sell alcohol, and retailers ought to ensure that wholesalers from 
whom they purchase alcohol hold a registration number from HMRC. The objective of the 
scheme is to address alcohol fraud.  However, the introduction of the scheme raises a 
number of questions.  Whilst wholesalers view the introduction of the scheme as a good 
measure to deal with rouge traders, the opportunities for the latter to operate would still 
exist. Local authorities view the scheme as an additional measure to address 
compliance, particularly from business owners purchasing alcohol from ‘unknown’ 
sources (white van man). However, AWRS will most likely be insufficient to eradicate the 
practice as some business owners would purchase from registered wholesales, whilst 
still getting cheaper alcohol from unknown sources insofar as there is a market for the 
distribution and consumption of cheaper (and potential counterfeit) alcohol.  
 
The Licensing Act 2003 (England and Wales) regulates both premises and persons. 
However, as the alcohol offer is made more mobile, with an increasing amount of 
takeaways (24/7 delivery services) available, the inspection and enforceability of these 
outlets would be more difficult to operationalise. This kind of outlets create ready-made 
markets to place in the market counterfeit alcohol. Given the authorities’ limited 
resources, not only financially, but also in terms of expertise and staffing, there will be 
more reliance on intelligence.  Therefore, the authorities need to re-think their strategies 
in order to target their resources more efficiently.  
 
Capable guardianship  
 
Regulators, local authorities and the industry itself can jointly be capable guardians, 
whose actions can prevent the distribution and consumption of counterfeit alcohol. The 
industry has a vested interest in the prevention/enforceability of counterfeit alcohol due to 
the unfair competition that rouge traders can create. The industry can act as capable 
guardians by spreading the word when there are suspicions that a wholesaler is involved 
in inadequate practices. In so doing, the industry can provide an important source of 
intelligence. However, this kind of cooperation between the industry and the authorities 
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may not operate at every level of the market. Business owners at the lower-end of the 
market could be more reticent to share information with the authorities.  Generally, the 
research encountered problems to speak to wholesalers and business owners, with one 
business owner retracting from an interview over concerns that researchers would 
provide information to the police or other authorities. Without this valuable intelligence, 
the authorities would be less capable to address the problems of counterfeit alcohol as a 
consequence of their limited resources, and their reliance on intelligence and consumer 
complaints. Increasing coordination between the diverse authorities and the industry will 
be necessary to deal with the production, distribution and consumption of counterfeit 
alcohol. The coordination and approaches taken by the authorities will gain more 
significance in light of Brexit, particularly if there is no-deal with the European Union, due 
to the impact that Brexit will have in terms of access to valuable information, the 




Understanding counterfeit alcohol markets 
 
The market in counterfeit alcohol can be viewed as similar to that of counterfeit 
cigarettes. The data from the case study suggests that the market is fractured and that 
there is a clear distinction between the production activity and distribution. If this is the 
case we would anticipate that there is a discreet production network where the alcohol is 
distilled, or cleansed of unwanted additives (for example the cleansing of screen wash) 
as in denatured alcohol and the dilution of industrial alcohol or smuggled distilled alcohol 
from another jurisdiction. There are cases of each of these types of forms of production, 
this suggests that there are a number of production strategies, however, they are not 
easily analysed as we have little or no data on how such production operations are 
managed and organised.  
 
The lack of data concerning production indicates that the production of counterfeit alcohol 
occurs in a number of locations. In case C Trading Standards officers were called to a 
production site by the police. The officer describes it in the following terms: 
 
“When we arrived there was basically this warehouse full of screen wash. Literally 
some of the containers had the name of the car manufacturer on the actual 
1000L….So when we got there were lots of 1000L containers, some of them were 
still full, there were bottles, empty bottles, labels, facilities to hook in labels onto 
the bottles…It was a full on start to finish bottling plant…..it would have been very 
capable of processing a lot of ‘vodka’.” (TSO C) 
 
The Trading Standards officer was asked if they gained any intelligence or understanding 
of how this plant linked to other forms of production of distribution. The response is 
interesting: 
 
“No, primarily because it became a police matter and the police took it on. We 
attended from a counterfeit point of view...but it wasn’t a tested brand, it was a 
kind of developed brand if you like, a straightforward vodka type. So, we weren’t 
interested because it wasn’t counterfeit per se.” (TSO C) 
 
This does appear to have been an opportunity to gain access to information concerning 
the link between distribution and production but it was not pursued. The brand being 
produced was not discovered in retail outlets: 
 
“They obviously produced a lot of quantity, I think, around 50000L. That is a lot of 
bottles to be produced but it never materialised probably because it is a two tier 
brand, so, it could only have been sold in independent off-licences...so unless 
somebody complains about it would probably never go on Trading Standards 
radar.” (TSO C). 
 
This suggests that those small independent retailers are relatively free from regulatory 
oversight and so are able to sell illicit forms of alcohol unimpeded. The only thing that 
brings such retailers to the attention of the regulator is a complaint by a consumer. This 
means that the retailer can purchase from ‘white van man’ and have no responsibility for 




In all cases (A, B and C) and in the Case Study there is a lack of data concerning 
production. It is not possible to link the distribution to a particular production site and so 
the origins of counterfeit alcohol are essentially unknown. The alcohol could originate 
from an illegal still, from a cleansing plant or it could be smuggled alcohol diluted and 
bottled as a large brand. However, in each case the quantity is not insubstantial.  
 
This raises the question of what is the volume of counterfeit alcohol on the market? 
There are few seizures, but as noted above it may be that the alcohol is at a point in the 
market where it does not come onto the regulator’s radar. This makes the sizing of the 
counterfeit alcohol market problematic. It may be that it is located in particular areas and 
that the amount in terms of total alcohol consumed is relatively small. If this is the case 
the lack of seizures would be indicative of the amount of counterfeit alcohol in circulation. 
It is important that we are careful not to over-estimate the size of the problem, however, 
as reported by respondents, the reduction in resources and the demands of other 
priorities results in episodes of counterfeit alcohol being responded to rather than it being 
a priority in its own right that is policed with a pro-active strategy. 
 
The distribution market in counterfeit alcohol appears to be dependent on integrated 
networks of distribution. What is evident from the cases reported here and the case study 
is that it is complicated for Trading Standards officers and police to trace the origin of 
counterfeit alcohol. In the case study we were able to provide a network analysis of the 
data that linked people together with product and location. This enabled an 
understanding of how the market is established and it indicated that there were linkages 
between different nodes and different locations. The distribution of the counterfeit vodka 
is structured in a way that allows for market penetration and yet the actors to remain at a 
distance from the point of delivery. The following diagram outlines how the vodka was 




David is the logistics node and he owns Delivery Limited, a logistics company located in 
jurisdiction A. David has connections with Stephen, Sean and Richard who have been 
involved in the sale of counterfeit wine (wine that did originated from its stated area of 
origin) through a trading website. David and Stephen also have links to John and Andrew 
in jurisdiction B who are the final receivers of the consignment of counterfeit vodka that 
David agrees to move for Stephen. This diagram shows that the counterfeit vodka is 
simply moved from one jurisdiction to another utilising legitimate logistic networks 
(represented in grey) and the counterfeit vodka is returned to the ‘owners’ once it enters 
the brown areas. This suggests that this supply chain is robust, once in jurisdiction B it is 
then broken down into smaller consignments and distributed to off-licences, corner shops 




The diagram represents the movement of a significant consignment and this is the 
property of Paul, who is also connected to John and Andrew. The data suggested that 
Andrew was involved in the distribution of the smaller consignments and Paul as a food 
wholesaler is able to distribute some the counterfeit vodka through this business either as 
‘legitimate’ product or to acquaintances as illicit vodka. However, the investigation did not 
fully explore the distribution mechanisms from the food wholesaler.  
 
When we combine this data with the Cases A, B and C we can discern a pattern of 
distribution of the smaller consignments. In all cases those apprehended with illicit 
product claimed to have bought the vodka from a man in a white van. The taxi driver in 
Case C was thought to have regular customers and was selective in relation to his 
customer base, this may suggest that he was cautious and had a limited supply, there 
was little or no surplus to his order requirements. In relation to case B the delivery was 
from a white van and in Case A the purchase was made from a wholesaler who was 
using fake invoices. It is not known whether the fake invoices were used to provide cover 
for the purchaser or were used to convince the purchaser that it was a legitimate 
transaction. 
  
The data suggests that the distribution of counterfeit alcohol is on a substantial scale with 
there being networks of people involved in the movement of significant quantities of the 
product to locations where it can be broken down and distributed to local areas either for 
further distribution or direct to sellers. Where the networks exist may indicate that there is 
a consistent supply chain of counterfeit alcohol entering the market place. However, it is 
important to understand this market place in more detail. The consumers are motivated, 
essentially, by low cost. The points of purchase are either via local social networks, as in 
Case C (taxi driver) or through small independent retail outlets that are able to purchase 
outside of their normal supply chains without question or are prepared to buy from 
sources that are not able to guarantee the authenticity of the product. It is feasible that 
each borough or local government area could map such outlets and use this information 
to begin building intelligence in relation to potential areas where counterfeit alcohol could 
be sold. It is apparent that the distribution of counterfeit alcohol is not random but is 
targeted to areas where there is a lack of capable guardianship and where there is a 
demand for cheap alcohol.  
 
It is also possible that supply chains of illicit alcohol are episodic. There may not be a 
consistent supply of counterfeited vodka. This may be due to supply shortages, 
breakdown of the various production and distribution networks and the loss of a 
consignment through law enforcement activity. The failure of a supply chain is disruptive 
to the consumer, however, in relation to the provider this may not be damaging as they 
reinstate supply when they are able to provide illicit product. It is possible that the supply 
of illicit alcohol is not confined to one type of product. A provider may be able to supply 
counterfeit vodka and smuggled vodka for a similar price. In fact, they could maintain a 
price uniformity between both types of illicit alcohol. This would assist them in 
maintaining the market and may reduce consumer anxiety over the provenance if they 
are not aware of the authenticity of the product. We found no cross over between 
smuggled and counterfeit alcohol in the cases or case study, but this may be because 
regulators fail to look for a market that supports both types of illicit alcohol distribution. If 
this is the case, then the introduction of counterfeit alcohol to the market is a supplier 
strategy to maximise their profit. Illicit alcohol, whether counterfeit or smuggled, meets 
the market criteria of cheap alcohol and so the buyer is unaware of the provenance of the 





Conclusions and recommendations 
 
The research has thrown some light on the distribution and consumption of illicit alcohol 
and in particular counterfeit alcohol. One reason for the consumption of counterfeit 
alcohol is because it meets the criteria of cheap alcohol for those consumers that do not 
have the economic resources to purchase alcohol via retailers where the supply chain is 
verified. This suggests that there are specific markets that are more vulnerable to the 
sale of counterfeit alcohol. We anticipate that these markets are located in less 
economically advantaged areas as cheap alcohol provides access where it is denied in 
the traditional and verified markets. These markets are structured around small 
independent retailers that are less prone to regulatory scrutiny, especially in the present 
economic circumstances of austerity.  
 
This is associated with the lack of resources available to regulators. Trading Standards 
Offices and Environmental Health Offices have a raft of statutory responsibilities that they 
are experiencing difficult in meeting. Consequently, proactive operations to search for 
illicit alcohol are unlikely to happen as the resources are not available for such 
operations. It also needs to be remembered that such operations come with investigative 
and prosecution costs and so the motivation to undertake proactive operations of this 
nature must be low. One regulator commented that there was a lack of response when 
there was a request for information and intelligence from another regulatory body after a 
seizure. The response this suggests is one of ignoring the issue and responding only 
when it is necessary to do so.  
 
Regulators have commented that investigations, when undertaken, are difficult to mount 
because of the need to work across different agency boundaries and at times across 
jurisdictions. It is also apparent from the regulators that in these multi-agency 
investigations it can be difficult to identify the lead agency and on occasions an 
investigation can be taken over by one agency that seems to exclude other relevant 
agencies. This is not just a feature of these counterfeit alcohol investigations but is 
common across many multi-agency investigations where there is no lead investigation 
agency and where the resources for the investigation are limited and not shared equally.  
 
All locations are not equally vulnerable to counterfeit alcohol markets. In the more 
affluent areas, there will be more economic resources to purchase alcohol via retailers 
where the supply chain can be verified. This finding should assist regulators in targeting 
investigative resources more effectively.  
 
Recommendation 1: To understand in more detail the size of counterfeit alcohol markets 
it would be beneficial to undertake research in areas that are vulnerable to the sale of 
counterfeit alcohol. 
 
Due to the limited resources of Trading Standards Offices and Environmental Health 
Offices there are few, if any, proactive investigations of counterfeit alcohol distribution. As 
noted above, Operation OPSON notes the volume of counterfeit alcohol in circulation 
amongst participating countries, however, across the UK there seems to be little 
regulatory priority allocated to counterfeit alcohol. The Food Standards Agency does note 
counterfeit alcohol in the Food Crime Unit’s Strategic Assessment of 2016, however, 
there are no reported cases on the FSA website and some simple advice on how to spot 
fake alcohol. HMRC’s response to this research also suggests that there is little priority 
given to counterfeit alcohol and so there is no regulatory strategy other than caveat 
emptor. We are of the view that this lack of regulatory strategy creates a ‘blind spot’, or a 
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place where activity takes place and is unseen by the regulator as they do not change 
their focus of attention significantly enough to bring the blind spot into their view.  
 
Recommendation 2: The increase of the commitment of regulators to developing an 
investigative strategy will be enhanced by an increase of investigative resources, clear 
lines of authority in any investigation, a multi-agency approach and a sharing of 
investigative costs.  This would encourage the development of a coherent and 
strategically joined up approach to the policing of illicit alcohol markets.  
 
The data from the respondents to this research suggest that the motivator in purchasing 
counterfeit alcohol is financial. However, it is worth noting that there is also an element of 
risk management by some consumers who purchase counterfeit alcohol knowingly and 
that they buy from a trusted source. The market appears to be managed via word of 
mouth and the establishment of trust between consumer and seller. The consumer only 
introduces verified and trustworthy other consumers, thus protecting the market and the 
seller provides alcohol cheaply and not obviously harmful. This appears to be a relatively 
clandestine market, not open to public scrutiny and located in that place where there is 
an absence of regulatory oversight. The priority of obtaining cheap alcohol by consumers 
suggests that they do not differentiate between counterfeit and smuggled alcohol. There 
is no evidence in this research to suggest that the market in counterfeit and smuggled 
alcohol are organised by the same people, it is our view that we might anticipate some 
overlap in order to maintain supply. 
 
Recommendation 3: There appears to be little understanding of the market in smuggled 
alcohol and it would be beneficial to gain a greater understanding of this market, and its 
relationship to the markets in counterfeit alcohol via further research. 
 
Minimum Unit Pricing (MUP) is viewed as a possible means of reducing alcohol 
consumption. In the areas where counterfeit and smuggled alcohol are available the 
impact of MUP is thought to be minimal. There may be the unintended consequence of 
making counterfeit and smuggled markets more lucrative and so they could expand. It is 
known that smuggling is motivated by price differentials (usually duty differences 
between jurisdictions). Brexit may also cause border issues and smuggled alcohol may 
be a problem of small proportion compared to other duty and regulatory issues. It is 
possible that MUP and Brexit could combine to expand counterfeit markets. 
 
Recommendation 4: There is an importance in regulatory bodies having a clear strategic 
vision in relation to counterfeit alcohol in the immediate future that is designed to limit 
market expansion. 
 
The case study reveals that there is an additional market to pubs and clubs for 
counterfeit alcohol. The consumer is unaware of the lack of authenticity of the alcohol 
purchased. Landlords it seems are encouraged to purchase counterfeit alcohol with ‘no 
questions asked’ to maximise their profits in a competitive industry. The case study data 
suggests that the origin of the pub trade counterfeit alcohol is the same as the localised 
individual consumption market. One interpretation of the case study data is that the 
markets in counterfeit product are well entrenched and that there is a continuity of supply. 
If this is the case, then the counterfeit alcohol market is lucrative and unimpeded and so 
of little risk to those involved in its organisation. There is, however, an important caveat to 
this conclusion. Due to the partiality of the data it is not possible to size the market, it is 
therefore, easy to both over-estimate and under-estimate its actual size. Caution must be 






Recommendation 5: Ensure that the sizing of the counterfeit alcohol market is not 
estimated in such a manner that it inflates the size of the problem. 
 
Alcohol is vulnerable to a number of different types of criminal activity. For example, it 
can be counterfeited, where the alcohol is not authentic and has been placed in the 
market as branded product. It can be smuggled, it is sourced in a different jurisdiction 
and the duty is evaded thus making it a cheaper product and it can be used as a 
deception. This is where the product is what it says it is, wine, but of a lower quality than 
stated on the bottle. These are not new crimes, alcohol has been subjected to such 
crimes over the centuries and so its vulnerability is recognised. However, there appears 
to be a lack of resources and priority given to protecting the consumer from counterfeit or 
fake booze. There appears to be a lack of proactive action by regulators and alcohol 
companies do what is necessary to protect their brands. There have been few serious 
cases reported as a result of the consumption of counterfeit alcohol, notwithstanding the 
fatalities at clandestine distilleries. There appears to be little or no pressure on regulators 
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